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Abstract
This paper employs an endogenous merger formation approach in a two-country
oligopoly model of trade to examine the international linkages between the nature of
mergers and tari¤ levels. Firms sell di¤erentiated products and compete in a Bertrand
fashion in product markets. We nd two e¤ects playing key roles in determining equi-
librium market structure: the tari¤ saving e¤ect and the protection gain e¤ect. The
balance between these two e¤ects implies that, when foreign country practices free
trade, unilateral tari¤ reduction by a domestic country yields international mergers ir-
respective of the substitutability levels. By contrast, when foreign tari¤s are su¢ ciently
high and products are close substitutes, national mergers obtain in the equilibrium.
Therefore, the implications of unilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market
structure depends on the trade regime in foreign country especially when products are
close substitutes. Unlike this asymmetric result of unilateral trade liberalization, we
nd that when bilateral tari¤s are su¢ ciently low, international mergers arise. These
results t well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by
an increase in international merger activities. Finally, from a welfare perspective, we
show that international mergers are preferable to national mergers and thus social and
private merger incentives become aligned together as trade gets bilaterally liberalized.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, along with international trade liberalization, world economy
has witnessed the largest ever merger movement with a particular characteristic of high
incidence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As).1 New patterns of globalization
have accelerated the internationalization of industries and reshaping of global industrial
structure. According to the World Investment Report (WIR) 2007, international mergers
and corporate take-overs have been the key driver of global foreign direct investment FDI
ows since the late 1980s and cross-border M&As have been enlarged by 23% to $880 billion
in 2006, and the number of transactions has been increased by 14% to 6,974 reecting a
strong global M&A activity in general. An interesting feature of the current wave of cross-
border M&As is that it is truly international, as opposed to the previous merger waves
which involved primarily U.S. rms. It no longer makes sense to see takeover booms and
busts as national phenomena. While most of the mega deals with transaction values of
more than $1 billion were carried out in developed countries, 17% of the cross-border M&As
were realized in developing countries and transition economies and China is the leading host
country among developing countries by far.2
Most cross-border M&As have been horizontal in nature, aiming at free access to the
export market via savings on tari¤s and trade costs, increasing market power, economies of
scale, technological synergies, eliminating excess capacity, or consolidating and streamlining
innovation strategies and R&D budgets.3 This paper attempts to provide an explanation for
the high incidence of cross-border mergers by focusing on the rst two of the above incentives.
Specically, we examine the implications of the fall in tari¤s and trade costs on the nature of
mergers. Despite the increase in cross-border M&As, the literature on international trade
and FDI has paid little attention to this phenomenon.4 Instead, the focus has been the
international location decisions of rms.5 There exists an extensive literature on domestic
1Over this period, countries have pursued trade liberalization along several front: unilaterally, preferen-
tially with a few partner and multilaterally within the world trade organization (WTO). As a result, average
tari¤ levels have fallen dramatically especially in manufacturing industries.
2For example, while the volume of cross-border M&A was less than a billion dollar in Turkey, it has
reached to an unprecedented level of $50 billion for the 2005-2007 period.
3The leading industries in the manufacturing sector in terms of worldwide cross-border M&A activities
have been automobiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and food, beverages and tobacco. The immediate
examples in the auto industry include the ones between Daimler-Chrysler, Renault and Nissan and GM and
Saab.
4Recently, Horn and Persson (2001b), Norback and Persson (2004, 2006), Benchekroun and Chaudhuri
(2006), Bjorvatn (2003) and Qiu and Zhou (2006) study cross border mergers as an alternative mode of
entry.
5In this literature, rms typically face a trade-o¤between the xed cost of an additional plant in the export
market and the benet of economizing on tari¤s and trade costs. Markusen (1995) surveyed the theoretical
literature on FDI and multinational enterprises (MNE). This literature includes papers by Dunning (1977),
Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (1998).
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mergers and merger policy while international merger activity is relatively under-researched.6
We aim at lling these gaps in the literature along both dimensions.
What are the e¤ects of unilateral and bilateral tari¤ reduction on the nature of mergers
(national or international) that emerges in the equilibrium? Which type of mergers (national
or international) is preferred from a welfare point of view? What if tari¤ determination and
merger formation are both endogenous? To address these questions, the present paper uses
the cooperative approach of endogenous merger formation developed by Horn and Persson
(2001a, 2001b) in determining equilibrium market structure for di¤erent degrees of product
di¤erentiation and tari¤ levels.
The model considers an oligopolistic industry in which rms sell di¤erentiated goods and
compete in prices. The interaction between rms takes place in two stages. In the rst
stage, we determine the industry structure: rms decide whether to merge domestically,
internationally or stay as competing units. In the second stage, rms compete over prices
in the product markets (Bertrand fashion). Unlike much of the literature on mergers and
competition policy, we follow Deneckere and Davidsons (1985) approach and utilize price
competition in the product market. Since Salant et. al. (1985) it is well known that under
quantity competition, merging rms can actually lose from a merger since the merged unit
concedes market share to outside rms. As a result, it is important to examine merger and
trade policies in an environment where rms actually gain from mergers. In other words,
it seems unsatisfactory to examine a governments optimal degree of market concentration
without ensuring that rms actually desire that level of concentration. Like much of the
literature on trade policy under imperfect competition, we assume that markets are seg-
mented i.e. there is no arbitrage across international markets and rms make independent
decisions regarding what price to charge in each market.
It is important to note that origins of merging rms are important due to the existence of
trade policy in the model. If asset owners from the same country merge, the resulting rm is
a national rm that faces a tari¤disadvantage in the export market while enjoying protection
in the domestic market. On the other hand, if asset owners from di¤erent countries merge,
the resulting rm is international in nature and has the advantage of avoiding tari¤s and
trade costs in both markets.
In exploring the nature of merger incentives, two e¤ects play crucial roles: the protection
gain and the tari¤ saving. The rst e¤ect represents the anti-competitive impact of trade
6See Cheung (1992), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Levin (1990), Perry and Porter (1985), Salant et al.
(1983) for the protability of horizantal mergers. Benchekroun (2003) and Dockner and Gaunersdorfer
(2001) examine the same question in the case of a dynamic competition. Another line of research explores
regulation issues and the interaction between merger policies and trade liberalization. Examples of this line
of research are: Barros and Cabral (1994), Collie(2003), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Levinsohn (2001),
Richardson (1999) and Saggi and Yildiz (2006).
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policy and arises when rms are national units while the tari¤ saving e¤ect simply captures
the incentive to avoid tari¤s and trade costs by merging with a rm in the export market. The
balance between these two counter-acting e¤ects determine the bargaining structure among
rms in merger formation. Within our model, the tari¤ levels and the degree of product
di¤erentiation together create a trade-o¤ between the relative attractiveness of national and
international mergers. When tari¤ levels and the degree of product market competition
among rms (i.e. products are su¢ ciently close substitutes) are both su¢ ciently high, the
former e¤ect dominates the latter generating a tendency for national mergers. On the other
hand, when tari¤s are su¢ ciently low (close to free trade), the tari¤ saving e¤ect dominates
the protection gain and the higher the degree of product di¤erentiation the more likely this
result obtains.
The implications of unilateral home trade liberalization are examined at two extreme for-
eign trade policy regimes. When foreign country practices free trade, lowering home tari¤s
induces rms to form international mergers irrespective of the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion. However, when foreign tari¤s are su¢ ciently high (at a prohibitive level), the impact of
unilateral home trade liberalization depends upon the degree of product di¤erentiation: the
international mergers arise at the equilibrium when products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated
whereas equilibrium mergers are national in nature when products are close substitutes.
Then, we examine the e¤ects of bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers
by assuming a common exogenous tari¤ level in both markets and then by lowering it. In
contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, the tari¤ reduction is realized in both markets so
that both the tari¤ saving e¤ect and the protection gain from tari¤s decline. The main result
here is that, as trade gets bilaterally liberalized, the resulting equilibrium market structure
is the one with international mergers. This result is consistent with the fact that global trade
liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross-border merger activities.
Furthermore, turning to welfare, three e¤ects play crucial roles in determining preferred
market structures from a welfare point of view: (i) the standard trade-o¤ between the e¤ects
of market concentration on producer surplus and consumer welfare (ii) the standard anti-
competitive e¤ects of tari¤s and (iii) the free rider e¤ect that can be measured as the amount
by which the prots of a non-merging rm increase when a merger happens and it arises
under asymmetric market structures. Among equilibrium market structures, we nd that
the tari¤ saving feature tips the balance in favor of international mergers and thus we nd
that social and private merger incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberalized.
This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger
policies under a more liberal trade environment.
Finally, we allow that trade policy in each country may respond to changes in market
structure and examine the equilibrium market structures under optimum tari¤s. Our rst
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nding is that the relationship between protection incentives and market concentration de-
pends on the nature of the concentration: while optimum tari¤s rise as market gets more
concentrated nationally, the opposite arises when higher concentration arises due to inter-
national mergers.7 This result stems from the fact that when rms merge internationally,
benet of protection is shared with a foreign partner. Then, we nd under endogenous trade
policy that international mergers arise when products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated while
national mergers arise in the equilibrium when products are close substitutes. This nding
implies that when the products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, private and social incentives
tend to move together under endogenous trade policy.
The present paper is closely related to Horn and Persson (2001b) that employs a similar
model to show that the international pattern of ownerships depends on trade and production
costs. Unlike the present paper, Horn and Persson (2001b) does not exclude prohibitive
trade cost levels and considers a homogeneous-good Cournot model. When trade costs are
prohibitive, rms enjoy high market power (monopoly power if nationally merged) in the
domestic market and thus national ownership structures necessarily arise in the equilibrium.
However, once the prohibitive trade costs are excluded, the only surviving equilibriummarket
structure is the one with international mergers. The present paper argues that a market
structure with national mergers emerges in equilibrium even under non-prohibitive tari¤
levels. Moreover, only bilateral (symmetric) trade liberalization is examined in Horn and
Persson (2001b). Our analysis of unilateral trade liberalization is complementary to their
analysis. More importantly, if one interprets trade costs as tari¤ levels, the equilibrium
characterization in Horn and Persson (2001b) implies that an empty set of market structures
(i.e. there is no equilibrium) arises for low tari¤ levels in their trade cost saving model.
The present paper shows that the choice of price as a basic strategic variable instead of
quantity overcomes this problem and this improvement stems from the fact that under
price competition every single merger is protable and there is no trivial elimination of
concentrated market structures. Finally, unlike Horn and Persson (2001b), the present paper
also examines equilibrium market structure under endogenous trade policy.
7There are number of empirical studies that explores the interaction between the industry concentra-
tion and the level of protection. The results are inconclusive. Whereas Treer (1993), Gawande (1997), and
Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) found signicant positive relationships between industry concentration
and the level of protection, Baldwin (1985), and Anderson and Baldwin (1987) report a negative relation-
ship. The present paper provides one explanation for this ambiguity in the sense that the nature of the
concentration (national or international) is important in determining optimal trade policy.
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2 Model
The model is a two country partial equilibrium set-up in which countries are denoted by
z = H (home country), F (foreign country). In each country, there is a single industry
consisting of two rms that produce symmetrically di¤erentiated products. We denote the
home rms by i = h; h0 and foreign rms by i = f; f 0. Firmsassets are located in their
own domestic country. We assume that entry to the industry is restricted.8 Firms own
the exclusive technology for their particular brand (e.g. through patents) and each rm is
described by its brand demand function. The marginal cost of production for all rms is
assumed to be constant (c  0) and identical.
Following Shubik (1980), let the utility function be dened as:
U(qz) = 
X
i
qiz   1
2
(
X
i
qiz)
2   2
1 + 
[
X
i
q2iz  
(
P
i qiz)
2
4
] (1)
where  is a positive constant, qz is a vector of quantities: qz = (qhz; qh0z; qfz; qf 0z), qiz
denotes rm is sales in country z and [0;1) is a measure of substitutability between
products. Then, we obtain the following symmetric demand system:
qiz(pz) =
1
4
(  piz   (piz   1
4
nX
j=1
pjz)) (2)
where pz is a vector of prices and piz denotes the price charged by rm i in country z. It
is important to note that the degree of product di¤erentiation between any two goods is
the same and when  approaches zero, products become unrelated (extreme heterogeneity)
while they become perfect substitutes when  goes to innity. From hereon, without loss of
generality, we assume that c = 0.9
The game proceeds as follows. In the rst stage, industry structure is determined through
bargaining between the rm owners: they decide whether to merge domestically, internation-
ally or stay as competing units. In the second stage, rms compete in the product markets
in a Bertrand fashion. Constant marginal costs and price competition together indicate that
markets are strategically separated from each other. Thus, we assume that markets are
segmented.
In determining market structure, we utilize a cooperative approach of endogenous merger
formation developed by Horn and Persson (2001a). However, unlike Horn and Persson
(2001b), we utilize price competition as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). In our model, a
merger of two rms is equivalent to perfect collusion between them. In other words, merging
rms are allowed to shut down the operation of some of their plants but may not alter the
8It may be due to some rm-specic ownership advantages of the incumbent rms.
9Alternatively, one can always transform the variables as follows:  =   c, p = p  c.
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characteristics of their products. It is well known that under price competition, if allowed by
the competition authority, rms have incentives to merge all the way to monopoly because
the combined prots of all rms in other market structures are smaller than monopoly prots.
Since the focus is on the distinction between national and international mergers, only two-
rm mergers are allowed and highly concentrated market structures (monopoly and the
duopoly with the international merger of three rms) are excluded.10 The symmetry of the
model indicates that there are 10 possible ownership structures that can be represented by
5 di¤erent market structures:11
1-) No mergers: hi = fh; h0; f; f 0g
2-) Triopoly with one national merger: hNi = fhh0; f; f 0g, hfN 0gi = fh; h0; ff 0g
3-) Triopoly with one international merger: hIi = fhf; h0; f 0g; hI 0i = fhf 0; h0; fg; hI 00i =
fh0f; h; f 0g and hI 000i = fh0f 0; h; fg
4-) Duopoly with two national mergers: hNNi = fhh0; ff 0g
5-) Duopoly with two international mergers hIIi = fhf; h0f 0g and hII 0i = fhf 0; h0fg
The impact of trade liberalization on the equilibriummarket structure (EMS) is examined
by assuming exogenous tari¤ levels faced by exporting rms and then lowering those tari¤s.
The existence of tari¤ protection implies that the origin of merging rms matters. National
rms (either non merged units or domestic mergers involving rms from the same country)
have trade protection in their own country but face a tari¤ disadvantage while serving in the
export market. By contrast, an international rm (involving one rm from each country) is
assumed to be able to produce each of its varieties in each of the two countriesmarkets,
thereby avoiding tari¤s in both markets.
In order to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game using backward
induction. Thus, we rst take the market structure and exogenous tari¤s as given and analyze
the product market equilibrium. We denote the tari¤s per unit of output in the home and
foreign country by tH and tF respectively.
2.1 No mergers hi
The prot maximization problem of rm i in the export market of country z under hi is
given by:12
max
fpig
iz =
(piz   tz)[  piz   (piz   Pz)]
4
(3)
10We simply assume that the competition authorities rule out these highly concentrated market structures.
11Hereafter, in order to save on notation, each market structure will be referred to its rst ownership
structure and denoted by the corresponding notation.
12While serving in the domestic market, tari¤s drop out.
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where z = F if i = h; h0, z = H if i = f; f 0, and Pz denotes the average price realized in
country zs market: Pz 
P
j
pjz
4
, where j = h; h0; f; f 0. The rst order condition for the
above problem yields rm is reaction function under hfgi:
piz =
4+ P iz
2(3 + 4)
+
tz
2
(4)
where P iz denotes the sum of prices of rm is competitors and it equals: P iz =
P
j 6=i
pjz.
As expected, since prices are strategic complements, we obtain positively sloped reaction
functions. The equilibrium price charged by rm i under hi is found by solving the rst
order conditions of all rms simultaneously. We denote the equilibrium price of rm i in
country z under market structure S by pSiz. Due to symmetry and market segmentation, we
focus on home country only:13
phH = p

h0H =
4
(3 + 8)
+
2tH(3 + 4)
(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
(5)
pfH = p

f 0H =
4
(3 + 8)
+
tH(3 + 4)(5 + 8)
(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
It is immediate from the above price levels that a countrys tari¤ raises the price charged by
the exporting rms more than the one of its own rms:
@pfH
@tH
>
@phH
@tH
> 0. In order to ensure
the market access of exporting rms under hi, we exclude prohibitive tari¤ level (denoted
by tz

):14
qiz  0 i¤ tz  tz =
2(7 + 8)
32 + 18 + 16
where z = F if i = h; h0, z = H if i = f; f 0
2.2 One national merger
Now, consider the market structure hNi under which home rms merge while foreign rms
stay as competing units.15 While the prot maximization problem of foreign rms stay the
same as under hi, home merger solves the following problem in the export market:
max
fphF ;ph0F g
NmF =
X
m=h;h0
(pmF   tF )[  pmF   (pmF   PF )]
4
(6)
Then, the following equilibrium prices obtain in home and foreign markets under hNi:
pNhH = p
N
h0H =
2(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)
4(22 + 9 + 8)
(7)
pNfH = p
N
f 0H =
(3 + 4)[2+ tH( + 2)]
2(22 + 9 + 8)
13The explicit formulae of the equilibrium prots under each market structure are reported in the appendix.
14This is a reasonable assumption since such tari¤s are rarely witnessed in todays world economy.
15Due to symmetry, we obtain the same expressions for foreign merger under hN 0i.
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and
pNhF = p
N
h0F =
2(7 + 8) + tF ( + 2)(5 + 8)
4(22 + 9 + 8)
(8)
pNfF = p
N
f 0F =
2(3 + 4) + tH( + 2)]
2(22 + 9 + 8)
In the pre-merger situation under hi, when a rm contemplated raising price, it did
not care about the positive externality it would confer upon the other rms. However,
by internalizing this positive externality, home merging rms set a higher price under hNi
relative to hi: pNhH > phH and the increase in price due to a merger gets larger (smaller) as
own (foreign) tari¤s rise: @[p
N
hH phH ]
@tH
> 0 >
@[pNhF phF ]
@tF
. More importantly, since the reaction
function of foreign rms has a slope uniformly less than one, non-merged foreign rms free
ride by raising their prices less than the home merger and thus enjoying price increase and
market share gain together.16
Since home rms raise the price after merger, it is immediate that the condition tH  tH
still guarantees the market access of foreign rms in home market under hNi:17
qNfH = q
N
f 0H  0 i¤ tH  tHN =
2(3 + 4)
2 + 8 + 8
> tH

qNhF = q
N
h0F  0 i¤ tH  tH
2.3 One international merger
In our model, tari¤s can be avoided by merging with local producers in the export market.
Consider the market structure hIi under which rms h and f merge while other rms (h0
and f 0) stay as competing units. While the prot maximization problem of non-merged
rms stay the same as under hi, international merger solves the following problem in each
market:
max
fphz ;pfzg
Imz =
X
m=h;f
pmz[  pmz   (pmz   Pz)]
4
(9)
The simultaneous solution of rst order conditions leads to the following equilibrium prices
under hIi:18
pIhz = p
I
fz =
4(7 + 8) + tz(3 + 4)
8(22 + 9 + 8)
(10)
16Under free trade, free rider e¤ect can be so strong that the prots of non-merging rms exceed those of
the merged unit.
17Note that the prohibitive tari¤ level under hNNi is the same as tHN .
18pFf 0(I) and p
F
h0(I) can be found easily by replacing tH with tF in p
H
h0(I) and p
H
f 0(I).
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and
pIh0H =
(3 + 4)[4(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)]
4(7 + 8)(22 + 9 + 8)
(11)
pIf 0H =
(3 + 4)[4(7 + 8) + tH(11
2 + 40 + 32)]
4(7 + 8)(22 + 9 + 8)
Note that internationally merged rms h and f have free access in both markets under hIi
while rm h0 faces tF and rm f 0 faces tH in the export markets. Thus, the export market
access of rms h0 and f 0 is more limited relative to other market structures and this leads to
a lower prohibitive tari¤ level under hIi:
qzi (I)  0 i¤ tz  tI =
4(3 + 4)(7 + 8)
233 + 1522 + 256 + 128
< tz
 where z = F if i = h0, z = H if i = f 0
As a result, in order to ensure market access under all possible market structures, we assume
that tz < t
I holds from hereon.
2.4 Two national mergers
When there exist two national mergers, merged home and foreign rms solve the same
problem in the export markets as in (6) and the following prices obtain:19
pNNhH = p
NN
h0H =
2
( + 4)
+
tH( + 2)
(3 + 4)( + 4)
(12)
pNNfF = p
NN
f 0F =
2
( + 4)
+
tH( + 2)
2
(3 + 4)( + 4)
As might be expected, among all possible market structures, the highest equilibrium price
levels obtain under hNNi due to the existence of both tari¤ and merger e¤ects.
2.5 Two international mergers
When all rms merge internationally, they save on tari¤s and free trade emerges. Interna-
tionally merged rms solve the same problem as in (9) and the following prices obtain:
pIIiz =
2
( + 4)
(13)
Next, we sort out the equilibriummarket structures using an endogenous formation approach.
19Due to symmetry, we can obtain the prot maximization problem and equilibrium values in foreign
country by replacing tH with tF .
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2.6 Endogenous merger formation
The solution procedure in the present paper is based on the endogenous merger formation
model developed by Horn and Persson (2001a).20 Based upon the earlier literature on merg-
ers, and on actual observations of rmsbehavior, they take the view that merger formation
can be treated as a cooperative game since parties involved in the formation process are free
to communicate and sign binding contracts. This approach is a generalization of traditional
merger analysis since comparisons are made between all feasible market structures rather
than two exogenously given market structures one of which is a strict concentration of the
other.
In this model, there are three basic components: (i) decisive Firms; (ii) dominance
Relation; (iii) solution criterion: Core. The rms that have the power of enforcing a market
structure hsai over another market structure 
sb are called to be decisive rms. Given the
denition of decisive rms, dominance relation works as follows: hsai dominates 
sb if and
only if the combined prot of the decisive rms is larger under sa than the one under sb.21
Two assumptions are made in the merger formation process. First, any payments between
coalitions are not allowed. Second, when forming a merger, participating rms can choose
any payo¤ distribution among themselves subject to the constraint that the total payo¤
distributed be exactly equal to the merged units total prot in the second stage of the
game.
In order to illustrate the main ideas behind these components, consider the comparison
between hNi = fhh0; f; f 0g and hIi = fhf; h0; f 0g under both of which rm f 0 stays as a
competing unit. Since payments between coalitions are not allowed, rm f 0 is not able to
inuence the ranking of these market structures so that it is not a decisive rm. Now turn
to other rms. If the market structure hNi is formed, rm f does not participate in any
merger. In order to prevent this, if rm fs prot is higher under hIi, it may o¤er to rm h
a larger share of payo¤ of the merger under the market structure hIi. On the other hand,
rm h0 may make a counter-o¤er to induce a merger with rm h if its prot is higher under
hNi. This bargaining process implies that rms h, h0, and f have the ability to a¤ect the
ranking of market structures hNi and hIi so that these rms are dened to be decisive rms
denoted by DN&I = fh, h0, f g.22
20There are other alternative approaches to endogenize merger formation. Kamien and Zang (1990) o¤ered
an acquisition process modeled as follows: Each owner makes o¤ers or bids for every other rm and announces
an asking price for her own simultaneously. Equilibrium market structure is determined following a general
allocation scheme once all bids and asking prices are known. This approach applies to situations where
there are many rms and owners. Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Ray and Vohra (1998) portray the merger
formation as a non-cooperative extensive form bargaining game.
21See Horn and Persson (2001a) for formal denitions of decisive rms and dominance relation.
22It is important to note that the dominance relation is not transitive if decisive group(s) of rms is (are)
not the same. Furthermore, it is clear that two market structures can not dominate each other simultaneously.
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Note that there may be more than one group of decisive rms. As another example,
consider now the ranking of the following two market structures: hi = fh; h0; f; f 0g, and
hIIi = fhf; h0f 0g: All four rms are decisive with respect to these two market structures.
However, merger formation processes are not linked so that there are two distinct groups
decisive rms: D&II1 = fh, f g, D&II2 = fh0, f 0g. If there are two groups of decisive rms,
it is required that domination holds for each of the groups.
Finally, the solution concept is the core: equilibrium market structures are the ones that
are undominated.
3 Trade liberalization and equilibrium market struc-
ture
Before proceeding, let si denote the total prot (sum of domestic and export prot) rm i
earns under market structure s: si =
P
z=H;F
siz. Now, we are ready to state the following
lemma that will be useful in determining the set of equilibrium market structures:
Lemma 1: Suppose that tz < t
I holds. Then, a single concentrative merger is always
protable: (i)
P
i=h;h0
Ni 
P
i=h;h0
i ; (ii)
P
i=f;f 0
NNi 
P
i=f;f 0
Ni ; (iii)
P
i=h;f
Ii >
P
i=h;f
i and
(iv)
P
i=h0;f 0
IIi >
P
i=h0;f 0
Ii .
Note that the above lemma provides support to the traditional merger literature under
price competition since non-merged units always have incentives to merge. Using the above
lemma and the denition of decisive rms, it is immediate to argue that the market structures
hi, hNi, and hIi are dominated and thus they fail to arise in the equilibrium and hNNi
and hIIi remain the only candidates that can arise at the core. Thus, in determining the
set of equilibrium market structures, the comparison between the market structures hNNi
and hIIi is taken as a base scenario in order to highlight the decisive forces in the merger
formation process. Since there is only one decisive group comprising all four rms with
respect to hNNi and hIIi, aggregate industry prots are compared. Let Rsi denote the total
revenue of rm i under market structure s. Then we can dene the relative attractiveness of
national mergers denoted by gII&NN(tH ; tF ) as follows:23
gII&NN(tH ; tF ) =
X
i
RNNi (tH ; tF )  tH
X
i=f;f 0
qNNiH   tF
X
i=h;h0
qNNiF  
X
i
RIIi (tH = 0; tF = 0)
(14)
Using the di¤erentiation technique, the function in (14) evaluated at (ctH ; btF ) can be be
rewritten as follows:
23Naturally, gII&NN (tH = 0; tF = 0) = 0.
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gII&NN(ctH ; btF ) = Z ctH
0
X
i
@RNNi (tH ; tF = 0)
@tH
dtH+
Z ctF
0
X
i
@RNNi (ctH ; tF )
@tF
dtF ctH X
i=f;f 0
qNNiH   btF X
i=h;h0
qNNiF
(15)
The sign of gII&NN(tH ; tF ) hinges on two distinct e¤ects: the protection gain e¤ect and
the tari¤ saving e¤ect. The former e¤ect represents the anti-competitive impact of the trade
policy that arises when rms are national units and is captured by the rst two terms in
(15). They simply measure the change in the national mergers aggregate prots net of tari¤
payment relative to a scenario where both countries practice free trade. Since trade policy
reduces the degree of competition in the domestic market, it tends to make the industry
prots under hNNi higher. On the other hand, the tari¤ saving e¤ect is captured by the
last two terms in (15). They create incentives for rms to merge internationally in order to
avoid tari¤s in the export markets. The balance between these two e¤ects helps determine
which of these market structures (hNNi or hIIi) would arise in the equilibrium. Here,
it is important to emphasize the fact that the degree of product di¤erentiation  acts as
an important determinant of the relative strengths of these two counteracting e¤ects since
it measures the intensity of competition in the product markets. Next, we examine the
implication of unilateral trade liberalziation on the set of equilibrium market structures.
3.1 Unilateral trade liberalization
To examine the impact of unilateral home trade liberalization on the nature of mergers, we
assume exogenous tari¤ levels (tH and tF ), and then we lower home tari¤s keeping foreign
tari¤s unchanged. To this end, we isolate two distinct trade policy regimes in the foreign
country. First, consider a scenario where foreign country practices free trade.
3.1.1 Free trade abroad
When there is free trade in foreign country, the type of mergers arising in the core is only
governed by the di¤erence in aggregate prots in the home market and thus we focus on the
rst term and the third term in (15).
gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) =
Z tH
0
X
i
@RNNi (tH ; tF = 0)
@tH
dtH   tH
X
i=f;f 0
qNNiH (16)
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c represent the behavior of gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) for three di¤erent
degrees of product di¤erentiation.24 When products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated ( = l),
24Hereafter,  is normalized to 1 in order to illustrate critical tari¤ and substitutability levels that deter-
mine the set of equilibrium market structures.
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gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) < 0 for all admissible th implying that the tari¤ saving e¤ect dominates
the protection gain leading to international mergers. The intuition can be explained as
follows. When products are highly di¤erentiated, rms already have high market power and
the marginal benet of tari¤ protection is small relative to tari¤ saving incentives. On the
other hand, when  is in the intermediate range ( = m), g
II&NN(tH ; tF = 0) takes a U-
shape and is positive only when home tari¤s are su¢ ciently high. Therefore, the tari¤ saving
e¤ect dominates the protection gain e¤ect unless home tari¤s are very high: international
mergers arise in the EMS when tH < tH holds while national mergers obtain when tH > tH
holds. 25 Finally, when products are close substitutes ( = h), product market competition
is severe and rms are close to the Bertrand paradox. Under such a situation, tari¤protection
provides rooms for national rms to enjoy prots in a highly competitive trade environment
so that the protection gain dominates the tari¤ saving e¤ect for a larger range of tari¤ levels
(tH declines).
- insert gures 1a, 1b, 1c here -
These observations about the behavior of gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) provide the basis for gure
2 that plots the critical tari¤ level tII&NNH () at which aggregate prots under hNNi and
hIIi are the same:
gII&NN(tH = t
II&NN
H (); tF = 0) = 0 (17)
where
tII&NNH () =
4(3 + 4)2
2 [2 + 10( + 1)] + 32( + 1)2
(18)
- insert gure 2 here -
The following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1 Suppose that foreign country practices free trade. Then, the following
obtains: (i) when  < min = 5:88 holds, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure for all tH ;
(ii) when   min = 5:88 holds, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure i¤ tH < tII&NNH ()
while national mergers ( hNNi) arise i¤ tH > tII&NNH ().
First, it is important to note from gure 2 and proposition 1 that the set of equilibrium
market structures is non-empty for all non-prohibitive tari¤ levels irrespective of the degree
of product di¤erentiation. In that sense, the model is well-behaved. Second, as expected
from the analysis above, tII&NN() is downward sloping in  and there exists a lower limit
min below which international mergers arise for all tH levels. More importantly, the above
25Norbäck and Persson (2004, 2005) show that the similar U-shape relationship obtains for bilateral trade
liberalization under Cournot competition with a strictly concave demand. Note that under price competition,
U-shape obtains only when  takes intermediate values (otherwise, monotonicity obtains).
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result provides support for the idea that when foreign country practices free trade, unilateral
home trade liberalization increases the incentives of rms to form international mergers
irrespective of the substitutability levels. What if foreign country practices very restrictive
trade policy? Next, we examine this question.
3.1.2 Restrictive Trade Policy Abroad
Now suppose that foreign country imposes the highest possible non-prohibitive tari¤ level
tF = t
I . Under such a scenario, the function gII&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
) can be rewritten as follows:
gII&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
) = gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) +
Z tI
0
X
i
@RNNi (tH ; tF )
@tF
dtF   tI
X
i=h;h0
qNNiF (19)
Note that since tF is su¢ ciently high, product market in foreign country approaches to a
foreign rm monopoly under hNNi. As discussed above, when products are su¢ ciently dif-
ferentiated ( = l), rmsbenets from tari¤ protection is limited. On the other hand,
relative to the case of free trade in foreign country, the tari¤ saving e¤ect gets more pro-
nounced when tF = t
I and thus gII&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
) < gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) obtains (see
gure 3a). As a result, hIIi arises in the equilibrium for all tH when products are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated.
- insert gures 3a, 3b, 3c here -
When  gets higher, the degree of product market competition and the existence of
high tari¤s in foreign country tip the balance more in favor of protection gain. As a re-
sult, gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) shifts upward making national mergers more likely to arise as
the equilibrium market structure. More specically, when  = m, g
II&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
)
takes a U-shape yielding two critical home tari¤s tII&NNH ()and t
II&NN
H () (see gure 3b):
gII&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
)  0 if either (i) tH  tII&NNH () or (ii) tH  tII&NNH () holds. Intuitively,
when tH is very low, home rms are ready to transfer a larger share of prots to foreign rms
in order to form an international merger. However, as tH falls below tII&NNH () , it is not
possible for home rms to convince foreign rms to engage in an international merger since
the di¤erence between the protection gain e¤ect and the tari¤ saving e¤ect for foreign rms
is greater than what home rms are able to o¤er. On the other hand, when tH exceeds
tII&NNH (), protectionist trade environment leads to national mergers due to merged rms
monopoly power in their own markets.
Finally, product markets are highly competitive when products are close substitutes
( = h) and thus regardless of home tari¤ levels it is impossible to attract foreign rms
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in forming an international merger: gII&NN(tH ; tF = t
I
)  0 for all tH (see gure 3c). The
following proposition summarizes the above discussion and illustrated in gure 4:
Proposition 2 Suppose that tF = t
I . Then, the following obtains: (i) when  < min =
5:88, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure for all tH ; (ii) when max = 8:06 >  
min = 5:88, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure if tII&NNH () > tH > tII&NNH () holds;
(iii) when max = 8:06    min = 5:88, hNNi is the equilibrium market structure if
either tH < tII&NNH () or tH > t
II&NN
H () holds and (iv) when  > 
max = 8:06, hNNi is
the equilibrium market structure for all tH .
- insert Figure 4 here -
Combining proposition 1 and proposition 2 we argue that when products are highly
di¤erentiated, international mergers emerge in the set of EMS irrespective of trade policy
regimes abroad. By contrast, when products are close substitutes and home tari¤ falls below
certain treshold, reversal of trade policy abroad from free trade to a protectionist regime
shifts the nature of equilibrium mergers from an international one to a national one.
Given the discussion above, it is natural to ask: what are the implications of bilateral
trade liberalization on nature of mergers? We examine this question next.
3.2 Bilateral trade liberalization
The e¤ects of bilateral trade liberalization on the set of equilibrium market structures is
examined by assuming a common exogenous tari¤ level (tH = tF = t) in both countries and
lowering it. The relative gain from national mergers is found as follows:
gII&NN(t) =
Z t
0
X
i
@RNNi (t)
@t
dt  t
"X
i=f;f 0
qNNiH +
X
i=h;h0
qNNiF
#
(20)
It is immediate from (16) and (20) that gII&NN(t) = 2gII&NN(tH = t; tF = 0). Conse-
quently, gII&NN(t) behaves the same way as gII&NN(tH ; tF = 0) illustrated in gure 1a, 1b
and 1c. To save space, we show the equilibrium market structures for di¤erent t and  levels
in gure 5. Note from gure 5 that there exists no equilibrium market structure only when 
is at the intermediate range and t is very high. The intransitivity of the dominance relation
leads to this non-existence problem. It is shown in the appendix that over the given region
hNNi dominates all other market structures except for hIi which, in turn, is dominated by
hIIi for all t and  levels (see Lemma 1).
- insert gure 5 here -
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The following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 Suppose that tH = tF = t. Then, the following obtains: (i) when
 < min = 5:88 holds, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure for all t; (ii) when  
min = 5:88 holds, hIIi is the equilibrium market structure i¤ t < tII&NN() while national
mergers ( hNNi) arise i¤ tI&NN() > t > tII&NN() and (iii) there is no EMS i¤ t >
maxftI&NN(); tII&NN()g.
The above result complements and improves the main ndings by Horn and Persson
(2001b) in two important ways. First, note that the set of EMS is empty under their
benchmark trade cost saving model when t < 1
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holds and this can be interpreted as follows:
when bilateral tari¤s fall below a certain treshold, Horn and Persson (2001b) has no ability
to conjecture an equilibrium market structure. On the contrary, we nd that international
mergers obtain over the same range of tari¤s. The choice of price as a basic strategic
variable instead of quantity overcomes this problem since every concentrative merger is
protable under price competition and there is no trivial elimination of concentrated market
structures. Second, unlike us, Horn and Persson (2001b) does not exclude the prohibitive
trade cost levels. When trade costs are at prohibitive levels, rms enjoy very high market
power (monopoly power if nationally merged) in the domestic market and thus national
ownership structures necessarily arise in the equilibrium. However, once the prohibitive
trade costs are excluded in their model, the only surviving equilibrium market structure is
the one with international mergers. The present paper argues that a market structure with
national mergers emerges in equilibrium even under non-prohibitive tari¤ levels.
Finally, the above proposition ts well with the fact that global trade liberalization has
been accompanied by an increase in cross border merger activities. One point deserves an
attention: when products are close substitutes, we obtain national mergers in the equilibrium
for su¢ ciently high tari¤s. This result seems to provide an opposite intuition to the tari¤-
jumping argument in the existing FDI literature. However note that the tari¤-jumping
argument is made for a single rm by focusing on only two alternative modes of entry:
export versus FDI. Unlike the present paper, these two alternatives are compared in the
export market when the degree of market concentration remains the same. Moreover, FDI
occurs via an international merger in oor model and all decisive rms involved in the merger
formation process benet from tari¤ saving and lose from tari¤ protection in their domestic
markets. By contrast, under a greeneld entry, rms investing in the foreign country directly
enjoy tari¤ saving without losing their gains from protection in the domestic market.
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4 Welfare Implications and Merger Policy
We continue assuming a common exogenous tari¤ level (tH = tF = t) in both countries, and
ask the following question: are the above equilibrium market structures the ones that are
preferable from a welfare point of view? Focusing on home country, aggregate welfare under
market structure s (denoted by wsH) is dened as the sum of its consumer surplus (CS
s
H),
total prots earned by its rms in both markets (PSsH) and tari¤ revenue under the given
market structures:
wsH =
P
i
(i   psiH)qsiH
2| {z }
CSsH
+
X
i=h;h0
si| {z }
PSsH
+ tH
X
i=f;f 0
qsiH| {z }
TRsH
, where s = hi ; hNi and hNNi (21)
wIH =
P
i
(i   pIiH)qIiH
2| {z }
CSIH
+
X
i=h;h0
Ii| {z }
PSIH
+ tHq
I
f 0H| {z }
TRIH
(22)
and
wIIH =
P
i
(i   pIIiH)qIIiH
2| {z }
CSIIH
+
X
i=h;h0
IIi| {z }
PSIIH
(23)
Even though no specic payo¤ division in any merger is assumed, from a welfare point
of view it is reasonable to assume that prots are evenly divided between the merging rms
since the feasible market structures are completely symmetric when tH = tF = t. We
identify three main forces determining the welfare ranking of di¤erent market structures.
First, as in the closed economy, there is a standard trade-o¤ between the e¤ects of market
concentration on consumer and producer welfare. In the open economy, part of the cost
of domestic concentration is transmitted to foreign consumers. Second, own tari¤s protect
national rms in the domestic country whereas foreign tari¤s punish them in the export
market and consumer welfare decreases in tari¤s. Note that this second source of tension
vanishes completely under a duopoly with two international mergers and partially under a
triopoly with one international merger. Finally, under asymmetric market structures (hNi
and hN 0i), a merger confers a large positive externality (free rider e¤ect) on competing rms.
The degree of the free rider e¤ect can be measured as the amount by which the prots of a
non-merging rm increase when a merger happens. As in Davidson and Deneckere (1985),
the free rider e¤ect of a merger is so strong that the prots of non-merging rms exceed those
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of the merged unit:
P
i=f;f 0
Ni 
P
i=h;h0
Ni and
P
i=h;h0
N
0
i 
P
i=f;f 0
N
0
i . Based on this discussion,
gure 6 illustrates the pattern of the most preferred market structures for di¤erent tari¤ and
substitutability levels.
- insert gure 6 -
First, we consider a scenario where the tari¤ levels are relatively low. Under such an
environment, the anti-competitive e¤ect of trade policy on consumer and producer welfare
does not play a major role from a welfare point of view. Moreover, when products are
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the free rider e¤ect under asymmetric market structures is not
very strong too. Then, the most important concern is the anti-competitive e¤ect of market
concentration on consumer and producer welfare. Therefore, as might be expected, the least
concentrated market structure hi is the most preferred market structure when products
are highly di¤erentiated. However, when products are close substitutes, there is a severe
competition among rms so that the free rider e¤ect of a foreign merger to home competing
rms tips the balance in favor of hN 0i.
Now consider a relatively more protectionist regime where the tari¤ saving feature of
international mergers gets more pronounced as do the anti-competitive e¤ects of the trade
policy on consumer welfare. For intermediate range of tari¤ levels, hIi arises as the most
preferred market structure. When trade policy is very restrictive, the duopoly with two
international mergers hIIi is the most preferred market structure for all substitutability
levels. Note that even though consumers lose from concentration and there is no tari¤
revenue, the tari¤ saving feature under international mergers dominates the other counter-
acting e¤ects.
Among equilibrium market structures (hNNi and hIIi), which one is more preferable
from a welfare point of view? The following result is immediate:
Proposition 4 Under symmetric tari¤s ( tH = tF = t), the duopoly with two interna-
tional mergers hIIi yields higher national (as well as world) welfare relative to the duopoly
with two national mergers hNNi for all t and .
In the present paper, we assume that the competition authority in each government
allows two rm mergers. Thus, rmsincentives to merge determine the set of equilibrium
market structures in our model. Welfare of home country under hNNi can be rewritten as
follows:
wNNH = w
II
H +
Z
@CSNNH (t)
@t
dt+
Z
@PSNNH (t)
@t
dt  t(
X
i=h;h0
qNNiF  
X
i=f;f 0
qNNiH ) (24)
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Note from a complete symmetry under hNNi and hIIi that the last term equals zero
since the tari¤ payments and tari¤ revenue are identical. Then, the comparison of home
countrys welfare under hNNi and hIIi is reduced to the following:
wNNH   wIIH =
Z
@CSNNH (t)
@t
dt+
Z
@PSNNH (t)
@t
dt (25)
The rst term in (25) measures the fall in consumer welfare due to tari¤s relative to
free trade. Thus, the rst term has a negative sign. The second term, on the other hand,
measures the change in aggregate prots net of tari¤payment relative to a situation in which
both countries practice free trade and has a positive sign unless products are very highly
di¤erentiated. Thus, the welfare ranking of equilibrium market structures depends on the
balance between the anti-competitive e¤ect of the trade protection on consumer and producer
welfare. Given our modeling specications, we show in the appendix that the former e¤ect
dominates the latter and hIIi is welfare-preferred to hNNi for all t and . Note also that
analogous results apply for the world welfare due to complete symmetry.
The above welfare analysis points out that there is a scope for welfare-enhancing merger
policies. Along the line of the literature investigating international linkages between trade
and merger policies, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 together imply that competition au-
thorities have less incentive to block mergers as trade gets liberalized: trade liberalization
induces more international mergers that are preferable to national mergers from a welfare
perspective. In other words, social and private incentives converge to each other as trade
gets bilaterally liberalized.
Next, we examine the equilibrium market structures under optimal tari¤ levels. To this
end, we add an additional stage to our original game in order to endogenize trade policy.
5 Equilibrium under optimum tari¤s
Thus far, our analysis does not recognize the fact that trade policy in each country may
respond to changes in market structure. To allow for this interaction, consider the following
game. In the rst stage, rm owners decide on the merger formation so that industry
structure is determined. Next, each country chooses a specic tari¤ on imports. Finally,
rms compete in prices in the product market. Solving the game backwards, we have the
same product market equilibrium as a function of tari¤s and market structure as before. It
is obvious in our model that there exist no tari¤s under a duopoly with two international
mergers hIIi and under the remaining market structures, each country chooses its optimum
tari¤ to maximize its welfare:
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max
tsH
wsH =
P
i
(i   psiH)qsiH
2| {z }
CSsH
+
X
i=h;h0
si| {z }
PSsH
+ tsH
X
i=f;f 0
qsiH| {z }
TRsH
, where s = hi ; hNi and hNNi (26)
max
tIH
wIH =
P
i
(i   pIiH)qIiH
2| {z }
CSIH
+
X
i=h;h0
Ii| {z }
PSIH
+ tHq
I
f 0H| {z }
TRIH
(27)
The solution to the above problem yields the following optimum tari¤s:
tH = t

F =
8( + 1)
32 + 26 + 24
; tNNH = t
NN
F =
4( + 1)
2 + 12 + 12
tNH = t
N 0
F =
2 [132( + 6) + 64(2 + 1)]
74 + 1223 + 5362 + 800 + 384
tN
0
H = t
N
F =
2 [392( + 2) + 120( + 1)2 + 8(6 + 1)]
274 + 3403 + 12762 + 1728 + 768
tIH = t
I
F =
16( + 1)(3 + 4)
313 + 2242 + 384 + 192
The tari¤ ranking shows that optimum tari¤s rise as the market gets more concentrated
nationally while they decrease in the number of international mergers. This result argues
that the interaction between the optimum tari¤s and the industry concentration depends
on the nature of the mergers (national or international). Unlike national mergers, foreign
rms share the benets from home protection in an international merger and this reduces
the incentives to impose tari¤s. Two immediate questions arise: when countries can respond
to mergers via optimal tari¤s, what is the set of equilibrium market structures? and among
these market structures, which are the ones that are preferred from a welfare point of view?
Proposition 5 When tari¤s are endogenously chosen, the following obtains: i-) the
duopoly with two international mergers ( hIIi) is the equilibrium market structure if  <
8:72; ii-) the duopoly with two national mergers ( hNNi) is the equilibrium market structure
if  > 8:72; iii-) the duopoly with two international mergers ( hIIi) is the most preferred
market structure from a welfare point of view for all .
In terms of equilibrium market structures, optimal trade policy regime yields results
similar to those obtained in our analysis of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization.
The rst two parts of proposition 5 states that the protection gain dominates the tari¤
saving when products are close substitutes while the opposite obtains when products are
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. Part (iii) of the above proposition argues that whether welfare
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superior market structure arises under endogenous tari¤s depends on the degree of product
di¤erentiation. When products are close substitutes, optimal trade policy responses result
in the least desired market structure (hNNi) as the equilibrium market structure. When the
products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, private and social incentives tend to move together.
6 Conclusion
Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we examine the international linkages be-
tween the nature of mergers and tari¤ levels. By linking tari¤ levels and merger incentives,
we aim at providing an explanation for the dominance of international mergers within the
largest ever merger movement the world economy has experienced over the last three decades.
Within the same framework, we focus on the merger policy implications of unilateral and
bilateral trade liberalization as well.
In the merger formation process, we show that two e¤ects play key roles: protection
gain and tari¤ saving. The former e¤ect represents the anti-competitive impact of trade
policy that arises when rms are national whereas the latter captures the incentives to avoid
tari¤s via an international merger. An analysis of these two e¤ects shows that the tari¤ level
and the degree of product di¤erentiation together create a trade-o¤ between the relative
attractiveness of national and international mergers.
Focusing on unilateral trade liberalization, we rst show that lowering home tari¤s leads
to international mergers irrespective of the substitutability levels when foreign country prac-
tices free trade. By contrast, when foreign tari¤s are su¢ ciently high and products are close
substitutes, national mergers arises in the equilibrium. Therefore, the implications of uni-
lateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure depends on the trade regime
in foreign country especially when products are close substitutes.
Our main result in the paper provides an opposite intuition to the tari¤-jumping argument
in the existing FDI literature: when bilateral tari¤s are su¢ ciently low, the equilibrium
market structure involves international mergers only. This result ts well with the fact
that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross border merger
activities. More complete analysis would also involve greeneld entry as a mode of entry.
We leave this for future research.
Furthermore, from a welfare perspective, we show that international mergers are prefer-
able to national mergers due to the fact that they help avoid deadweight loss of tari¤s.
Consequently, social and private incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberal-
ized. This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing
merger policies under a more liberal trade environment.
Following trade liberalization, other aspects of economic policy that are not harmonized
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have begun to receive more attention. The reduction in tari¤ rates has raised the issue of
harmonization of competition policies. In policy making, national mergers are often viewed
di¤erently from cross-border mergers. Even though this study does not model harmoniza-
tion explicitly, it can be captured simply through di¤erent xed regulation fees imposed on
national and international mergers. We intend to pursue this in future research.
7 Appendix
Prot levels
The following prot levels are used to prove the lemma and propositions. Note that prot
levels under common tari¤ can be found easily by assuming tH = tF = t.
Under hi:
hH = (3 + 4)

2(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)
2(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
hF = (3 + 4)

2(7 + 8)  tF (32 + 18 + 16)
2(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
Under hNi:
P
i=h;h0
NiH = ( + 2)

2(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)
8(22 + 9 + 8)
2
P
i=h;h0
NiH = ( + 2)

2(7 + 8)  tF (32 + 18 + 16)
8(22 + 9 + 8)
2
NfH = (3 + 4)

2(3 + 4)  tH(2 + 8 + 8)
8(22 + 9 + 8)
2
NfF = (3 + 4)

2(3 + 4) + tF ( + 2)
8(22 + 9 + 8)
2
Under hIi:
P
i=h;f
IiH = ( + 2)

4(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)
16(22 + 9 + 8)
2
P
i=h;f
IiF = ( + 2)

4(7 + 8) + tF(3 + 4)
16(22 + 9 + 8)
2
Ih0H = (3 + 4)
3

4(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)
16(22 + 9 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
Ih0F = (3 + 4)

4(3 + 4)(7 + 8)  tF (233 + 1522 + 256 + 128)
16(22 + 9 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
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Under hNNi:
P
i=h;h0
NiH = ( + 2)

2(3 + 4) + tH( + 2)
2( + 4)(3 + 4)
2
P
i=h;h0
NNiF = ( + 2)

2(3 + 4)  tF (2 + 8 + 8)
2( + 4)(3 + 4)
2
Under hIIi: P
i=h;f
IiH =
P
i=h;f
IiF =
2( + 2)
( + 4)2
Proof of Lemma 1
Using the above prot levels, the proof of the lemma is immediate. Let
 = 
2(573+2742+352+128)
[8(22+9+8)(3+8)(7+8)]2
,
	 = 
2(53+282+40+16)
32[(22+9+8)(+4)(3+4)]2
Then,X
i=h;h0
Ni  
X
i=h;h0
i = 


[2(7 + 8) + tH(3 + 4)]
2 + [2(7 + 8)  tF (32 + 18 + 16)]2
  0
where equality holds only when  = 0.
X
i=f;f 0
NNi  
X
i=f;f 0
Ni = 	

[2(3 + 4)  tH(2 + 8 + 8)]2 + [2(3 + 4) + tF( + 2)]2
  0
where equality holds only when  = 0.
X
i=h;f
Ii 
X
i=h;f
i =
X
z=H;F
( + 2)

4(7 + 8) + tz(3 + 4)
16(22 + 9 + 8)
2
 (3 + 4)
X
z=H;F

2(7 + 8) + tz(3 + 4)
2(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
 
(3 + 4)
X
z=H;F

2(7 + 8)  tz(32 + 18 + 16)
2(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
Finally,
X
i=h0;f 0
IIi  
X
i=h0;f 0
Ii =
22( + 2)
( + 4)2
  (3 + 4)3
X
z=H;F

4(7 + 8) + tz(3 + 4)
16(22 + 9 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
 (3 + 4)
X
z=H;F

4(3 + 4)(7 + 8)  tz(232( + 1) + 2 + 128( + 1)2)
16(22 + 9 + 8)(7 + 8)
2
Note that
P
i=h;f
Ii 
P
i=h;f
i > 0 and
P
i=h0;f 0
IIi  
P
i=h0;f 0
Ii since tz < t
I .
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c and 3 and proof of proposition 1
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Given Lemma 1, market structures hi, hNi, and hIi are dominated and thus they are
not in the set of EMS. Therefore, our focus is on hNNi and hIIi. Since the dominance
relation is one sided, it is su¢ cient to show that hNNi and hIIi dominate all other market
structures over the specied range of tH and .
(a) hIIi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. It is easy
to verify that II13 > 
O
1 + 
O
3 and 
II
24 > 
O
2 + 
O
4 hold for all tH and  since tH < t
I
(b) hIIi & hNi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Therefore, we compare total
industry prots under these two market structures and nd that (i) hIIi dominates hNi if
  20:8 for all tH ; (ii) hIIi dominates hNi if  > 20:8 and tH < tII&NH () hold; (iii) hNi
dominates hIIi if  > 20:8 and tII&NH () < tH < tI hold.
(c) hIIi & hN 0i: The decisive group comprises all owners. Therefore, we compare total
industry prots under these two market structures and nd that hIIi dominates hN 0i for all
tH and .
(d) hIIi & hIi: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hIIi dominates hIi for all tH and .
(e) hIIi and hNNi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Therefore, we compare
total industry prots under these two market structures and nd that (i) hIIi dominates
hNNi if   5:88 for all tH ; (ii) hIIi dominates hNNi if  > 5:88 and tH < tII&NN() hold;
(iii) hNNi dominates hIIi if  > 5:88 and tII&NN() < tH < tI hold where
tII&NN() =
4(3 + 4)2
2 [2 + 10( + 1)] + 32( + 1)2
(28)
Since tII&NN()  tII&NH () for all , combining (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) we nd that hIIi
is the EMS when (i)   5:88 for all tH or (ii)  > 5:88 and tH < tII&NN() hold.
We apply the same procedure for hNNi:
(f) hNNi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. It is easy
to verify that NN12 > 
O
1 + 
O
2 and 
NN
34 > 
O
3 + 
O
4 hold for all tH and  when tH < t
I .
(g) hNNi & hNi and hNNi & hN 0i: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hNNi dominates
both hNi and hN 0i for all tH and .
(h) hNNi & hIi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Therefore, we compare total
industry prots under these two market structures and nd that hNNi dominates hIi for all
tH and .
Combining (e), (f), (g), (h), we nd that hNNi is the EMS when  > 5:88 and tH >
tII&NN() hold. This completes our proof.
Figures 4a, 4b, 4c and 5 and proof of proposition 2
The same procedure is applied as above:
(a) hIIi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. We nd
that (i) hIIi dominates hi if  < 18:02 for all tH ;
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(ii) hIIi dominates hi if  > 18:02 for all tH < tII&OH () and (iii) hi dominates hIIi if
 > 18:02 and tII&OH () < tH < t
I hold.
(b) hIIi & hNi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Comparing industry prots,
we nd that (i) hIIi dominates hNi if  < 8:66 for all tH ; (ii) hIIi dominates hNi if  > 8:66
for all tH < tII&NH and (iii) hNi dominates hIIi if  > 8:66 and tII&NH < tH < tI hold.
(c) hIIi & hIi: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hIIi dominates hIi for all tH and .
(d) hIIi and hNNi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Therefore, we compare total
industry prots under these two market structures and nd that (i) hIIi dominates hNNi if
  min = 5:88 for all tH ; (ii) hIIi dominates hNNi if max = 8:06 >   min = 5:88 and
tII&NNH () > tH > t
II&NN
H () hold; (iii) hNNi dominates hIIi if max = 8:06 >   min =
5:88 and tII&NNH () < tH < t
I hold. Note that tII&NNH () and t
II&NN
H () are critical tari¤
levels that equate the industry prots under hIIi and hNNi.
Combining (a), (b), (c) and (d), we nd that hIIi is the EMS (i) for all tH when  <
min = 5:88 holds and (ii) if max = 8:06 >   min = 5:88 and tII&NNH () > tH >
tII&NNH () hold. Now consider hNNi.
(e) hNNi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. We nd
that hNNi dominates hi for all tH and :
(f) hNNi & hNi and hNNi & hN 0i: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hNNi dominates
both hNi and hN 0i for all tH and .
(g) hNNi & hIi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Comparing industry prots,
we nd that hNNi dominates hIi for all tH and . This completes our proof.
Figure 5 and proof of proposition 3
(a) hIIi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. We nd
that (i) hIIi dominates hi if  < 18:02 for all t;
(ii) hIIi dominates hi if  > 18:02 for all t < tII&O() and (iii) hi dominates hIIi if
 > 18:02 and tII&O() < t < tI hold.
(b) hIIi & hNi and hIIi & hN 0i: The decisive group comprises all owners. Comparing
industry prots, we nd that (i) hIIi dominates hNi if  < 8:66 for all t; (ii) hIIi dominates
hNi if  > 8:66 for all t < tII&N and (iii) hNi dominates hIIi if  > 8:66 and tII&N < t < tI
hold.
(c) hIIi & hIi: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hIIi dominates hIi for all t and .
(d) hIIi & hNNi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Comparing total industry
prots under these two market structures, we nd that (i) hIIi dominates hNNi if   5:88
for all t; (ii) hIIi dominates hNNi if  > 5:88 and t < tII&NN() hold; (iii) hNNi dominates
hIIi if  > 5:88 and tII&NN() < t < tI hold.
Next, we show that hNNi dominates all market structures other than hIIi over the
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specied range of t and  in gure 5 and proposition 3.
(e) hNNi & hi: There are two completely symmetric groups of decisive rms. We nd
that hNNi dominates hi for all t and :
(f) hNNi & hNi and hNNi & hN 0i: It is immediate from Lemma 1 that hNNi dominates
both hNi and hN 0i for all t and .
(g) hNNi & hIi: The decisive group comprises all owners. Comparing industry prots,
we nd that hIi dominates hNNi if and only if 7:123 >  > 5:88 and tNN&I < t < tI hold.
This completes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
The comparison of welfare levels under hIIi and hNNi leads to:
wIIz   wNNz =
( + 2)t [t2( + 6)( + 14) + 64t(2 + 1) + 8(3 + 4)2]
8( + 4)2(3 + 4)2
> 0:
Note that due to symmetry, the same result applies for the world welfare.
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